It should consider legislation to set up a new digital regulatory agency or authorize an existing one to oversee mobile app infrastructure. They have too few staff, little industry expertise, and no authority to write and enforce rules to protect the public.Ĭongress will have to do the job. Neither the courts nor the generalist law enforcers at the antitrust agencies are equipped to play this role. But the courts cannot effectively act as an ongoing constraint on Apple’s power. If one objective of abolishing the anti-steering rule is to bring a tangible benefit to app developers, then an industry regulator must supervise the market to prevent this kind of evasion, while still allowing Apple and Google the flexibility to improve the service they offer to consumers and app developers through their control of the operating system and the app markets.įarhad Manjoo concludes his analysis of the Apple “tax” with a call for legislative action if the courts fail to “police” Apple’s monopoly power. True, this tactic would cut into Apple’s current level of monopoly profits from the App Store, estimated at $72.3 billion in 2020, but it is not clear that the new circumstances would improve matters all that much for app developers. Evasion could take the form of Apple communication with potential app purchasers offering discounts or other rewards for using Apple’s own payment system. It is hard to see how the app consumer benefits from Apple’s anti-steering rule.īut a court mandate that Apple abandon its anti-steering rule is also not self-enforcing. The Amex decision was restricted to the transactions market where Amex cardholders received a tangible benefit from the anti-steering rule in the form of rewards for using the card. To do so would require distinguishing this case from an earlier Supreme Court decision that upheld Amex’s similar anti-steering rule, which prevented merchants from urging customers to use a cheaper payment method. But the court might find that it is anti-competitive and ban it. Apple put that rule in place so that it can get a higher return on its intellectual property investment in the App Store. To be effective, price regulation in the app industry would require an ongoing supervisory regulator that understands the app business well enough to both set prices and define service quality levels.Ī second possible remedy is a ban on Apple’s anti-steering rule, which prevents app developers from telling potential customers that they can pay for the app outside the App Store. The same is true of price caps in the mobile app infrastructure. Regulators in infrastructure industries like railroads, telephones, and energy utilities have known for generations that they must be able to define the structure and quality of the service provided if price regulation is to be effective. For Apple, this might mean that an app developer that receives regular treatment will pay the regulated price of 15%, but one that wants a privileged place in the store will have to pay the full 30%. If a monopoly company faces a price cap, it can respond by changing the level, structure, or quality of its service. But price regulation of a digital service is not self-enforcing. One possibility is a court-mandated price for Apple’s service to app developers, say 15% instead of 30%. As commentators have observed, Epic Games was consistently vague about the remedy it wanted. The problem is finding an adequate remedy under existing antitrust law. Only a supervisory agency tasked with overseeing the mobile app infrastructure, which would include the similar system operated by Google, can protect the public and app developers from abuse by these dominant companies. Antitrust law as currently understood and practiced provides few resources to rein in the kind of durable monopoly power Apple possesses. The trial judge promised that neither party to the case would like her decision, which is not a surprise.
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